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In Re: Cay Clubs, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 14 (Mar. 06, 2014)1
TORT LAW: PARTNERSHIP-BY-ESTOPPEL
Summary:
The Court determined five issues: (1) Whether the partnership-by-estoppel statute may
impose liability when there is representation of a joint venture rather than a partnership; (2)
Whether consent may be manifested expressly or may be fairly implied from conduct; (3)
Whether the phrase “given credit” is limited to the extension of financial credit; (4) Whether the
reliance on the representation of a partnership or joint venture must be reasonable; and (5)
Whether the statute may impose liability in claims that do not sound in contract.
Disposition:
First, under NRS 87.160(1)2, partnership-by-estoppel claims may apply when there is
sufficient representation of a joint venture rather than a formal partnership. Second, the consent
required for partnership-by-estoppel can be manifestly expressed or may be fairly implied from
the liable party’s conduct. Third, the meaning of the phrase “given credit” in the statute is not
limited to the extension of financial credit. Fourth, there is a reasonable reliance requirement for
a partnership-by-estoppel claim. Fifth, the statute may impose liability in claims, such as tort
claims, that do not sound in contract.
Factual and Procedural History:
Cay Clubs appeared to be a business that sold and developed condominiums at a resort
called Las Vegas Cay Club. Appellants, purchasers of these condominiums, allege that Cay
Clubs inflated the condominiums’ value by advertising that it would develop Las Vegas Cay
Club into a luxury resort. To induce potential buyers to purchase the condominiums, Cay Club’s
marketing materials represented that it was in a partnership with JDI entities. The purchasers
believed that JDI entities would provide the expertise and resources to execute the Las Vegas
Cay Club’s transformation.
Appellants claim that after selling the condominiums at Las Vegas Cay Club, Cay Clubs
disingenuously abandoned the plan to improve the resort and left the purchasers with “worthless
property.” Appellants filed suit against approximately 40 defendants, including Cay Clubs and
JDI entities. The claims included, but were not limited to, fraudulent misrepresentation,
deceptive trade practices, and fraudulent conveyances of money. Appellants also claimed JDI
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By Kelsey Bernstein
NEV. REV. STAT. 87.160(1) (2013) states:
When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents himself or herself, or consents to another
representing him or her to any one, as a partner in an existing partnership or with one or more persons not actual
partners, the person is liable to any such person to whom such representation has been made who has, on the
faith of such representation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and if the person has made such
representation or consented to its being made in a public manner the person is liable to such person, whether the
representation has or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit by or with the
knowledge of the apparent partner making the representation or consenting to its being made.
(emphasis added)
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entities were liable under NRS 87.160(1), Nevada’s partnership-by-estoppel statute, for the
wrongdoings of Cay Clubs.
After answering Appellant’s complaint, JDI entities filed a motion for summary
judgment. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion in favor of JDI entities on all
asserted claims against them, including the partnership-by-estoppel claim under NRS 87.160(1).
In this appeal, Appellees challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Discussion:
As long as other conditions are met, NRS 87.160(1) provides that a person may incur
partnership liability where there is a holding out of that person as a partner, with the consent of
that person being held out, and another person gives credit to the purported partnership upon
believing in the representation. Appellees appeal the lower court’s grant of summary judgment
disagreeing with the interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, the Court engages in de novo
review of the matters raised.
NRS 87.160(1)’s meaning
The Court’s ultimate goal in interpreting statutes is to effectuate the
Legislature’s intent. Therefore, the interpretation of NRS 87.160(1), Nevada’s
partnership-by-estoppel statute, is guided by the following rules set out by the
Legislature:(1) the law of estoppel applies to NRS 87.160(1), (2) this court is not
to apply “[t]he rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed,” and (3) the statutory scheme that contains NRS 87.160(1) “must be
interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law of those states which enact it.”3
The term “partnership” in NRS 87.160(1)
The parties disagree about whether the term “partnership” should be interpreted to
include not only a formal partnership but also a “less formal but collaborative profitoriented relationship, such as a joint venture.” A partnership is “an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a [ongoing] business for profit”4 whereas a joint
venture’s collaboration is limited to a specific business objective. Despite the distinction,
Nevada case law provides that the principles of partnership law also apply to joint
ventures5, and other jurisdictions have concluded the same. Therefore, partnership-byestoppel doctrine applies when the subject of the representation is either a formal
partnership or a joint venture.
The term “consents” in NRS 87.160(1)
The parties disagreed over the extent of consent required under NRS 87.160(1)whether it must be explicit or if it may be implied from one’s conduct. Following Black’s
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NEV. REV. STAT. 87.060(1) (2013).
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Law Dictionary (stating that consent may be expressed verbally or implied by conduct)6
and the Uniform Partnership Act comments (holding that consent may be implied when
the facts make the implication reasonable),7 “consent” under NRS 87.160(1) may be
manifested either by express words or by conduct from which consent can be reasonably
implied.
The phrase “given credit” in NRS 87.160(1)
The parties disagree on whether “given credit” is limited to the extension of
financial credit or can include a claimant’s belief and detrimental reliance on the
representation of a partnership’s existence. While this phrase represents a statutory
ambiguity, several other jurisdictions have held that “given credit” is not limited solely to
financial credit. The Court rejected JDI entity’s assertion that a revision of the 1997
version of the UPA, upon which NRS 87.160(1) was based, implied it was limited to
financial credit since the revision itself stated it continued the same principles from the
previous version.
Furthermore, to limit “given credit” to financial credit would “severely limit who
could utilize partnership-by-estoppel doctrine [because] NRS 87.160(1) would only
benefit claimants with the financial resources and expertise to extend financial credit to a
purported partnership.” Therefore, the phrase “given credit” includes giving credence to
the representation of a partnership by detrimental reliance on the representation, which
includes, but is not limited to, the extension of financial credit.
The reasonable reliance requirement
Like other jurisdictions, Nevada’s partnership-by-estoppel doctrine includes a
reasonable reliance requirement – often necessitating an exercise of due diligence to
ascertain facts. Without this requirement, the doctrine “would lack an objective limitation
to prevent it from being abused by people who knew, or reasonably should have known,
that the representation of the partnership or joint venture was untrue.”
NRS 87.160(1)’s applicability to claims that do not sound in contract
The parties disagree on whether liability under NRS 87.160(1) is limited to claims
that sound in contract. Because appellant’s claims are based in tort, such an interpretation
would preclude appellee’s liability under the statute. However, under Nevada law,
partners in a partnership are jointly and severally liable for injuries caused by a partner’s
actions within the ordinary course of business, and this liability extends to tortious acts.
The premise that detrimental reliance can exist in contractual matters, in which a party
relies on the existence of a partnership to a contract, but not in tortious matters, because a
victim does not rely on a partnership’s existence in sustaining an injury, is insufficient.
Because NRS 87.160(1) already requires a reliance element, the statute’s application does
not turn on whether the cause of action sounds in contract.
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BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 323 (8th ed. 2004).
Uniform Partnership Act § 16, 6 U.L.A. 661-62 cmt. (1914).

A review of our determinations about NRS 87.160(1)’a meaning
See “disposition”.
The summary judgment motion in favor of JDI entities
The Court then reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of JDI entities based on a lack of genuine issues of material fact.
The parol evidence rule and the purchasers’ evidence
JDI entities attempted to rely on the parol evidence rule to exclude evidence of a
partnership proffered by the condominium purchasers. However, because the purchase
agreement on which JDI relies is silent about the existence of a partnership between Cay
Clubs and JDI, the parol evidence rule did not prohibit evidence regarding the
representations of a partnership or joint venture.
The genuine issues of material fact
Additional evidence offered by the purchasers submitted in response to the
summary judgment motion demonstrate genuine issues of material fact. The marketing
materials used by Cay Clubs, including materials from the Cay Clubs website, show
several representations of a “profit-oriented relationship” between Cay Clubs and JDI
entities. Other evidence established a genuine issue of material fact about whether JDI
consented to the presentation of a partnership or joint venture.
Multiple purchasers submitted affidavits stating that they relied on the
representation of a partnership between Cay Clubs and JDI entities when purchasing their
condominiums, demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact regarding the purchasers’
detrimental reliance.
Conclusion:
The district court erred in granting the summary judgment motion in favor of
appellees JDI entities as to their liability under NRS 87.160(1). Appellants, purchasers of
Cay Clubs condominiums, demonstrated genuine questions of material fact with regards
to the existence of a partnership between Cay Clubs and appellees, appellees’ consent to
this partnership representation, and the appellant’s reasonable reliance on this
representation when purchasing the condominiums. Therefore, the order granting
summary judgment is reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

